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NOTES
ERRATum
In Note, Contempt by Publication, 59 YALE L.J. 534 (1950) at 537, it was
stated: "The Supreme Court denied certiorari in an unusual opinion dis-
avowing any implication that it approved the Maryland decision [Baltimore
Radio Show v. Maryland]." And in Footnote 22, at 538 it was stated: "The
opinion was written by Justice Frankfurter, who has been leader of the
Court minority seeking a rule more restrictive of press comment. This
suggests that the death within the last year of Justices Murphy and Rut-
ledge, strong supporters of newspaper freedom . ., may have altered the
balance of power [on the Court]."
The following corrections, while not bearing on the substance of the Note,
are obviously in order: (1) The opinion was that of Justice Frankfurter
as an individual justice and should not have been attributed to the Court as
a whole. (2) The inference drawn in Footnote 22 was unwarranted. As
pointed out by Justice Frankfurter, the only definite conclusion to be drawm
from a denial of certiorari is that "fewer than four members of the Court
thought it should be granted... ." State v. Baltimore Radio Show, 70
Sup. Ct. 252, 255 (1950). No suggestion as to views of other members of
the Court-new or old-should have been made on the basis of Justice
Frankfurter's opinion.
THE MAYFLOWER DOCTRINE SCUTTLED"
FRom 1941 until 1949 the American broadcasting industry fretted at the
leash of the so-called M1ayflower Doctrine 1 which was thought to prohibit
radio stations and individual licensees from editorializing over their own
facilities.2 This doctrine arose from the broadcasters' interpretation of a
* FCC, REPO T OF THE ComifssIo n THE MAA -rm or EDrro .%izIG ny BnoiAw-
CAST LicENsEzs, Docket No. 8516 (June 1, 1949).
1. The title was derived from the name of the case in which the FCC supposedly
announced the doctrine. Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941).
2. As generally understood, the supposed ban on editorializing applied both to the ra-
dio station as an institution and to the individual licensee. See, c.g., 12 Am L Rsv. 170,
171 (1941); Note, Radio Editorials and the Mayflower Doctrine, 48 CoL. L. R.v. 785
(1948). However, James L. Fly, FCC chairman at the time of the Mayflower decision,
recently stated that the Commission intended only to silence the station and not the
licensee-the reason for the distinction being that institutional prestige and goodwill
inevitably lend unfair weight to views expressed as those of the station, but that no such
problem arises where the views are identified as the personal views of the station licensee.
Communication to the YA=m LAWv JouRNAL from James L. Fly, dated April 4, 1950, in
Yale Law Library. See also FCC, OFFICIAL REPORT OF PRocEEVMGs n Trn MAT=rn or
EmITORIALIZING By BROADCAST LIcmsNEEs 1233-4 (1948). See page 764 infra.
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cryptic dictum in an FCC license renewal decision.3 Though never specif-
ically enunciated or applied by the Commission,4 it became the subject of
heated controversy. On the one hand it was vigorously defended as a safe-
guard of the public; I and on the other, vehemently denounced as an im-
proper restriction on free speech.' The outcome was the formal scuttling of
the Mayflower Doctrine by the FCC last June.7 In retrospect, the turbulence
surrounding the doctrine appears to have been a tempest in a teapot. For
when viewed in relation to the larger issue, that of securing fair radio treat-
ment of public issues, the Mayflower Doctrine played an inconsequential role.
Its demise, in practical terms, does not significantly alter either the ability
of station owners to advance their views, or the extent to which the public
is able to hear all sides of controversial issues.
Fundamental to evaluation of the Commission's action is the principle
that in a democratic society there should be maximum opportunity to ex-
press diverse viewpoints on controversial issues 8 and, equally important,
maximum opportunity to hear and read the conflicting views of others.'
Furthermore, the ban has most commonly been interpreted as applying only to overt
expressions of opinion by the station or licensee, or their personal representatives, See
Note, 12 AIR L. REv. 170, 171 (1941). The FCC apparently accepted this interpretation
as the basis for its "clarification" of the issue of editorializing. FCC, REoRT OF THUE
CoMMIssION IN THE MATTER OF EDITORIALIZING BY BROADCAST LicTNsEes 7-8 (1949).
Some, however, have construed the ban as extending to any advocacy of a position on a
public issue traceable to the licensee. See Note, Radio Editorials and the Mayflower
Doctrine, 48 COL. L. REv. 785, 792 (1948).
3. Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1941): "(T]he broadcaster can-
not be an advocate." See page 764 and note 26 infra.
4. See note 27 infra.
5. See, e.g., Note, Radio Editorials and the Mayflower Docrine, 48 COL. L. REV. 785
(1948); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SHOULD RADIO HAVE AN EDITORIAL POLICY
(1948); Crosby, Freedom of Speech on the Air, N.Y. Herald-Tribune, March 9, 1948, p.
19, col. 1.
6.. "[P]rohibition bf broadcast editorializing, by the Commission, is abridgement of
freedom of speech, whether the editorializing be done by a station licensee or otherwise."
FCC, OFFICIAL REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE MATTER OF EDITORIALIZING DY BROAD-
CAST LICENSEES 834 (1948) (statement of Justin Miller, president of the National Asso-
ciation of Broadcasters). See also brief for National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)
in the Matter of Editorialization by Broadcast Licensees (1948). When the FCC issued
its report, NAB president Miller jubilantly exclaimed that it was "the greatest single
victory'in behalf of freedom of expression in this nation since the Zenger case confirm-
ing the editorial freedom of newspapers over a century ago." Newsweek, June 15, 1949,
p. 51, ol. 1.
1 7. FCC, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF EDITORIALIZING 1Y BROADCAST
LICENSEES (1949). See page 766 infra.
8. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS
612 (1947); Justice Holmes' classic dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 629-31 (1919).',
' 9. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON FREEDOm OF THE PRESS, op. cit. supra note 8, at 16-20:
Ernst, Preedoi to 'Read, 'See, and Hear, 'Harper's,' July, 1945, p. 51; Fly, Radio
Regulation in the P;b c Interest, 213 ANNALS 102, 105 (1941).
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Since effective voicing of opinion in the present day generally requires
resort to privately owned media of mass communication, the practical im-
plementation of this principle depends upon the manner in which these
mass media are managed. 0 With respect to most major media the Federal
Government, faced with a strong constitutional interdiction against govern-
mental abridgement of free speech," can do virtually nothing to prevent
private management from abridging the right of the public to express and
be informed of varying opinions on controversial issues. In the case of radio,
however, the government claims, and to some extent has exercised, power to
promote a balanced presentation of views.
Unlike the private managers of other mass media, radio broadcasters,
who must utilize the limited number of publicly-oNved transmission fre-
quencies,' 2 operate their facilities as "trustees" of the public.13 The Federal
Communications Commission, with its exclusive power to license broad-
casters for operation over these frequencies,' 4 is charged with the duty of
insuring that broadcasters fulfill their direct obligation to serve the public
interest.15 Since broadcasting affects the public primarily through the
10. "Protection against government is now not enough to guarantee that a man who
has something to say shall have a chance to say it. The owners and managers of the
press determine which persons, which facts, which versions of the facts, and vhich
ideas shall reach the public." Comm-ssiox ox FRs.DO s or Tim Przss, op. cit. supra note
8, at 15-16.
11. U.S. CoNsT. AmmNr. I. Outside of radio, governmental restrictions on the use
by private owners of their communications facilities are imposed only where the public
is to be protected from some positive harm: e.g., speech which is offensive to mores, such
as obscenity; speech which is incident to illegal conduct, such as creation of monopoly,
false advertising, disturbance of the peace; speech which creates a "clear and present
danger that [it] will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre-
vent." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). This is not, clearly, affirma-
tive regulation directed at enhancing opportunities for expression of opinion.
12. The need for rational allocation of the limited number of broadcasting frequencies,
and the necessity for preventing stations from interfering with each other by transmitting
simultaneously-over the same frequency, have provided the basic justification for direct
governmental regulation of this medium. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 213, 216 (1943). The finite character of the frequency spectrum is
described in TaSAN, RADio ENGINERING 593 (2d ed. 1937); FCC, Rnio, A Punmac
Ppm&ER (1940). Public ownership of all broadcast channels is established in § 301 of
the Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1081 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1946) (herein-
after cited only as Communications Act).
13. "[A] radio broadcasting station must operate in the public interest and must be
deemed to be a 'trustee' for the public." Mclntire v. AVm. Penn. Broadcasting Co., 151
F2d 597, 599 (3d Cir. 1945). See also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190 (1943) ; FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940). See generally
Fly, Regulation of Radio Broadcasting it the Public Interest, 213 A:.,,xs 120 (1941);
Note, Radio Regulation and Frecdom of the Air, 54 HAv. L. R~. 1220 (1941).
14. Communications Act §§307, 309(a), 319. Broadcasters are licensed to operate
over assigned channels for three-year periods. 47 CODE FED. :REGS. § 3.34 (Supp. 1943).
15. This obligation arises from the statutory requirement that a license shall be
granted or renewed only if "public convenience, interest or necessity will be served
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subject-matter transmitted, the Commission has occasionally employed its
licensing power to exert control over the programming policies of broad-
casters."6 Statutory authority for such action is found in the requirement
that licenses be granted only where the public interest will thereby be
served. 17 Control is exercised by testing the program service of license ap-
plicants against the Commission's conception of program service in the
public interest.' 8 The criteria employed in making such evaluations con-
stitute, in effect, a code of program standards to which all broadcasters
must conform to guard against possible loss of license. 10 While broadcasters
have charged that this technique of program supervision violates the statu-
tory proscription of censorship 20 and the constitutional ban against abridge-
ment of free speech, 2' they have failed for twenty-three years to win judicial
or Commission indorsement of their view.
2 2
A vital facet of program supervision has been the Commission's efforts
to secure fair treatment of public issues. To this end, the FCC has declared
that broadcasters have an obligation to allot a reasonable amount of time to
treatment of controversial issues, and that they have an affirmative duty
to seek to provide representative expression of all responsible shades of
opinion. 23 This "fairness" formula 24 has seldom been challenged except by
thereby." Communications Act §§ 307, 309 (a). See Fly, supra note 13. For the history
of government regulation of radio in this country see WARNER, RADIO AND TElVISION
LAW §§ 92-5 (1948) ; 1 SocoLOw, TnE LAW OF RADIO BROADCASTING §§ 25-48 (1939).
16. See WARNER, RADIO AND TmVISION LAW c. III (1948); Segal, Recent Trends
in Censorship of Radiobroadcast Programs, 20 Rocxy MT. L. Rv. 366 (1948) ; Comment,
Radio Program Controls: A Network of Inadequacy, 57 YALE L.J. 275 (1947) ; Note,
Government Control of the Contents of Radio Programs, 47 COL. L. Ray. 1041 (1947).
17. See note 15 supra.
18. See materials cited in note 16 supra. See also Comment, Admisinstralivc Enforce-
ment of the Lottery Broadcast Provision, 58 YALE L.J. 1093, 1094-6 (1949).
19. Id. at 1109-11. For a full discussion of FCC program standards see WARNER,
RADIO AND TELEViSION LAW c. III (1948). See also other materials cited in note 16 siipra.
20. Communications Act § 326.
21. For an exposition of the broadcasters' arguments on both the statutory and con-
stitutional grounds, see brief of National Association of Broadcasters, supra note 6. See
also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, BROADCASTING AND THE BILL O1, RIGHTS
(1947).
22. The courts cleared this program control technique of charges of "censorship"
in Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932) ; KFKB Broad-
casting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931). See National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-17 (1943). The FCC has consistently maintained that
it has not exercised "either a negative or affirmative control of any program or proposed
program," Hearings before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 814, 78th Cong.,
1st Sess. 25 (1943), and more specifically that it "exercises no power of censorship over
radio communications." 7 FCC ANN. REP. 27 (1941). See Simmons v. FCC, 3 Pixa
& FISHER RADIO REG. 1029 (1947); FCC, Punic SERVICE RESPONSmiLITY OF BROADCAST
LICENSEES (1946). For the FCC's views on freedom of speech in relation to the more
precise problem of regulation of radio treatment of public issues, see FCC, REPORT O THE
CommIssIoN in THE MATR= OF EDITORIALIZING BY BROADCAST LtCENSEES 11 (1949).
23. The roots of this requirement trace back to the beginning of effective government
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those broadcasters who still contend that the Commission has no authority
to review program service. 25
regulation of radio in 1927. The Radio Act of 1927 required that stations allot equal
amounts of time to opposing political candidates for campaign purposes. 44 STAT. 116Z
1170 (1927).
This provision was retained when the act was replaced by the Communications Act
of 1934. Communications Act § 315. In 1929 the FRC (Federal Radio Commission) ex-
tended this requirement so as to apply "not only to addresses by political candidates but
to all discussions of issues of importance to the public." 3 FRC ANn. REP. 33 (1929).
The first timorous implementation of this policy is found in early decisions denying
or withdrawing licenses where religious, labor and other special interest groups proposed
to use, or had been using, stations as vehicles for expounding their particular views. See,
e.g., Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. FRC (FRC Dec. 17, 1928), reetd on other grounds,
37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930); Chicago Federation of Labor v. FRC (FRC May 20,
1929), aff'd, 41 F2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1930) ; Norman Baker, FRC Docket No. 967 (June
5, 1931) ; Kingshighway Presbyterian Church, FRC Docket No. 1012 (June 12, 1931);
KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. FRC, 47 F2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Trinity Methodist
Church, South v. FRG, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932); Young Peoples' Ass'n for the
Propagation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938).
A more affirmative policy was presaged in 1940 by the statement, "In carrying
out the obligation to render a public service, stations are required to furnish well-rounded
rather than one-sided discussions of public questions.' 6 FCC Aix. R . 55 (1940).
The following year the Mayflower decision was handed down defining this requirement
more precisely. See note 26 infra. Subsequent cases reiterated and elaborated upon the
basic formula. In United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945), for e.---mple, the license
renewal applicant, in line with the NAB Code (see infra) had a policy of refusing to sell
time to labor organizations for presentation of their views on public issues, while per-
mitting a hostile news commentator, Fulton Lewis, Jr., to air views sharply contrary to those
of the CIO. When sustaining time was granted to labor speakers, their scripts vere
strictly censored. Lewis, on the other hand, had complete freedom. The FCC while
granting renewal, condemned this policy. See also Homer P. Rainey, 3 Pin. & Fisnum
R io RFG. 737 (1947) (stations must allot a reasonable amount of time for broadcasts
incident to election campaigns in light of the importance of the particular election and
issues involved) ; Robert Harold Scott, 3 Piu & Fismm RAno REG. 259 (1946) (where
the tenets of atheism were directly attacked in broadcasts over a station, a "controversial
issue" was raised and, although few members of the community accepted that belief, rea-
sonable time must be granted to permit reply to the attacks). See note 25 inf ra. See
also WBNX, 4 PixE & FismR RADIO R G. 242 (1948) ; FCC, STATmE ,"T orF in Co.'I-
amssIox ix =E MAmat OF BRoADCAsT OF PROEGAaIS ADvERTISING ALconoLic BEVTnAGES,
5 Pn & Fis= RADiO .593 (1949); FCC, PUBLIC SsnvicE REsrosmmrry or
BROADCAST LicFNsszs (1946). The Commission's recent report on broadcaster editorial-
izing, note 7 supra, presents the most complete statement of the "fairness" formula.
Beginning in 1939, the radio industry sought to regulate itself through its own ver-
sion of the "fairness" formula. The original code forbade the sale of time for discussion
of controversial issues except in the case of political broadcasts and forums, and pro-
hibited the "coloring" of news broadcasts, although allowing "analyzing and elucidating
news so long as such analysis and elucidation-are free from bias." NAB, CoDE oF STAND-
ARDS OF BRoADCASTING PRAcrics 5 (1939). In a subsequent manual refining the Code,
the NAB indicated that foreign policy and birth control generally fall within the category of
"controversial," and that "discussion of labor problems on the air is almost alvays of a con-
troversial nature." NAB, CODE MANUAL (1939). The effect of the Code was to en-
courage broadcasters to minimize discussion of public issues as suited their preference.
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It was in line with this "fairness" formula that the FCC, by way of
dictum in its Mayflower decision in 1941, made the now famous statement
that "the broadcaster cannot be an advocate." 25 While it seems question-
See WHITE, THE AMERICAN RADIO 75 (1947); see also United Broadcasting Co,
supra. Following the United Broadcasting case the NAB hastily revamped its code
to accord with the FCC's pronouncement. Industry self-regulation proved no substitute
for government regulation in protecting the public interest. See WHrT, op. cit. supra,
at 74-82; ComMissIoN ON FREEom OF THE PRESS, A Fazx AND REsroNsiLmu Pu lss
72-4 (1947).
24. This phrase does not imply that there is or can be a rigid formula for testing
whether the requirements of fairness have been met in any given instance. It merely
denotes the general obligation of broadcasters to do their best to provide adequate and
balanced treatment of controversial issues of interest to the communities they serve, The
Commission has wisely said: "It should be recognized that there can be no one all embrac-
ing formula which licensees can hope to apply to insure the fair and balanced presentation
of all public issues. Different issues will inevitably require different techniques of pres-
entation and production. The licensee will in each irlstance be called upon to exercise
his best judgment and good sense in determining what subjects should be considered, the
particular format of the programs to be devoted to each subject, the different shades of
opinion to be presented, and the spokesmen for each point of view." FCC, REPORT OF Tur
COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF EDITORIALIzING BY BROADCAST Lic xsEns 6 (1949).
25. Broadcasters have frequently indicated agreement with the principle of fair
treatment of public issues over radio. E.g.: "The basis of the American system of broad-
casting is not the right of an individual to be heard, but the right of the public to hear."
Statement by Neville Miller, then president of NAB, quoted in Timberg, The Mythology
of Broadcasting, 6 ANTIOCH Rvmv 354, 357 (1946). See also COLUMBIA BROADCASTIXN
SYSTEM, WHAT THE NEWv RADIO RULES MEAN 24 (1941); NAB, CODE, supra note 23, A
poll of broadcasters by Broadcasting magazine, semi-official organ of the NAB, showed
that, of those broadcasters who felt ,they should have the right to editorialize, 65% felt
that there should be an obligation to provide fair opportunity for expression of differing
opinions; 29% opposed this view. Broadcasting, Dec. 22, 1947, p. 15, col. 1. Disagreement
arises primarily over whether the FCC should, or has authority to, enforce fairness. Many
broadcasters feel that their sense of "moral" responsibility for fair treatment of public
issues should be the sole sanction. N.Y. Times, April 20, 1948, p. 54, col. 7. See also
NAB, Brief, stpra note 6; N.Y. Times, March 2, 1948, p. 27, col. 1 (statements by pres-
idents of ABC and CBS) ; New Republic, March 15, 1948, p. 26. Others acknowledge
FCC responsibility for insuring fairness. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1948, § 2, p. 11,
col. 4 (statement by T. C. Streibert, president of WOR, key station of Mutual Broad-
casting System) ; ibid. (statement by Nathan Straus, president of WMCA).
Congressional concern over the problem of achieving fair radio treatment of public
issues was evidenced when the "fairness" formula was embodied in a bill proposing major
amendments to the Communications Act of 1934. S. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
However, when the FCC upheld the right of an atheist to radio time to defend his creed
against attacks (see Scott case, supra note 23) a House committee sharply rebuked the
Commission, stating that "controversial issues" to which the formula applied included only
political matters. H.R. REP. No. 2461, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
26. Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1941). The case arose in
1939 upon application of the Yankee Network for renewal of the license of its station,
WAAB. The Mayflower Broadcasting Company entered the proceedings by submitting an
application for grant of a construction permit to operate over the same frequency as
WAAB. In considering these competing applications, the FCC found Mayflower un-
qualified for a license because of a dubious financial structure and because of misrepresen-
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able that this dictum was originally intended to do more than reiterate the
Commission's policy that the broadcaster must be impartial in his overall
presentation of public issues,' the statement was immediately interpreted
tations of fact to the Commission. With respect to the Yankee Network, question Nwas
raised as to whether the network had breached its duty to the public by broadcasting
editorials supporting candidates for public office. The Commission found that this prac-
tice was inconsistent with the licensee's responsibilities to the public. Its full explanation
of its position was as follows:
"[T]he public interest can never be served by a dedication of any broadcast facility
to the support of [the licensee's] partisan ends. Radio can serve as an instrument of de-
mocracy only when devoted to the communication of information and the exchange of
ideas fairly and objectively presented. A truly free radio cannot be used to advocate the
cause of the licensee. It cannot be used to support the candidacies of his friends. It can-
not be devoted to the support of principles he happens to regard most favorably. In brief,
the broadcaster cannot be an advocate.
"Freedom of speech on the radio must be broad enough to provide full and equal
opportunity for the presentation to the public of all sides of public issues. Indeed, as
one licensed to operate in a public domain the licensee has assumed the obligation of
presenting all sides of important public questions, fairly, objectively and vithout bias.
The public interest-not the private--is paramount These requirements are inherent
in the conception of public interest set up by the Communications Act as the criterion of
regulation." Id. at 340.
After issuing this rebuke, the FCC, as is its wont, renewed Yankee's license in view
of its promise to discontinue the offensive practices. As a consequence, of course, no
appeal was taken.
27. Doubt as to whether the Mayflower decision actually proscribed broadcaster
editorializing is expressed in Heffron, Should Radio be Free to Ediloyiallwcl, 47 C0er-
womVF.AL 466 (1948); FCC, OFFIcAL RFoRT Oz; Pno rx oS ni Tim MATrEz op
EDrrORILIZINrG By BROADCAST LlcFxsEEs 633, 637, 640 (1948) (statements of Morris
Novik). At least two of the present members of the Commission appear to feel that the
decision imposed no ban. In the Commission's recent report on broadcaster edi-
torializing, FCC, REoRT OF THE Coumrssox IN TnE- MATTEa or EDrIA.MLZM-G n1
BROADCAST LicFSEEs, Docket No. 8516 (1949), the majority opinion is cast as a
"clarification" of the Commission's position in view of "apparent confusion concerning
certain of the Commission's previous statements... !" Id. at 1. Nowhere in the thirteen
page majority opinion is there any reference to an existing ban, nor does the opinion in
any way suggest that a ban is being lifted. The Mayflower case is cited only once, and
then with approval as standing for the proposition that "the licensee must operate on a
basis of overall fairness. . . ." Id. at 5. Even the dissenting opinion states that "we
should have such a prohibition [on editorializing]," and makes no mention of an existing
ban arising out of the Mayflower decision. Id., dissenting opinion.
Commissioner Jones, however, in his separate concurring opinion, states that the
Mayflower decision "fully and completely suppressed and prohibited the licensee from
speaking in the future over his facilities in behalf of any cause," and insists that that de-
cision must be reversed if, as both he and the majority intend, editorializing is to be
permitted. Id., Separate Views of Commissioner Jones, 1.
These doubts that the Mayflower decision banned editorializing seem fairly rell
grounded. See quotation from opinion, note 26 supra. Assuming that the second para-
graph modifies and clarifies the first, it is no more than a restatement of the proposition
that the broadcaster may not use his station as a personal instrument to serve his own
interests rather than the public interest. This is merely the "fairness" formula phrased
in the negative. If the Commission had intended so novel an action as imposing an edi-
1950] NOTES
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
as establishing a new corollary to the "fairness" formula."
3 Concerted broad-
caster protests against the supposed ban on licensee editorializing finally
induced the FCC to hold hearings on the question in the Spring of 1948,0
and one year later to issue a "clarifying" statement of policy. In its state-
ment the Commission confirmed the right of licensees to editorialize, but
firmly reminded them of their basic responsibility to insure overall balance
in discussion of public issues.3"
The Commission's decision seems a wise one. Broadcaster editorializing does
not appear to raise a threat of unfairness so distinct from that involved in other
forms of partisan broadcasting as to warrant an attempt to gag that particular
source of opinion. It has been urged that the prestige of the station and
licensee almost inevitably lends such weight to their open expressions of
opinion as to make them unfair per se.3 ' Factually, this seems to be an un-
warranted fear. Labelling an opinion as that of station WOR, for example,
would scarcely appear to give it distinctively more force than tagging it as
the view of United States Steel, or expounding it as the objective news
analysis of Edward R. Murrow. And whatever the reputation of the broad-
caster, this reputation is a factor which appropriately weighs in public eval-
uation of competing viewpoints. It has been further contended that a broad-
caster, once he has taken an open stand on an issue, will find it impossible to
torial ban, it would seem that far more precise language would have been employed.
Aside from the wording of the decision, there is no contemporary evidence as to the
Commission's intent. Former chairman Fly recently maintained, however, that the de-
cision was calculated to ban station, but not licensee, editorializing. Communication to
the YALE LAW JOURNAL from James L. Fly, dated April 4, 1950, in the Yale Law
Library. See note 2 supra.
28. See note 2 supra. Prior to the Mayflower decision broadcaster editorializing was
apparently assumed to be permissible. See 2 SocoLow, LAW OF RADIO BROADCASTING
§448 (1939).
29. FCC, OFFICIAL REPORT IN THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE MATTER OF EDITORIALIZING
BY BROADCAST LICENSEES (1948). Hearings were held for eight days during March and
April, 1948.
30. FCC, REPORT IN THE MATTER OF EDITORIALIZING BY BROADCAST LICENSEES
(1949). Chairman Coy and Commissioner Walker did not take part in the decision. The
majority opinion presented the views of Commissioners Hyde and Sterling. Commissioner
Webster adopted the majority opinion and submitted an additional statement summarizing
his version of the essential points in that opinion. Commissioner Jones, while concurring
with the majority in permitting editorializing, offered a separate opinion sternly chastis-
ing the majority for failing to revoke the Mayflower decision and acknowledging that it
had abridged the First Amendment. Commissioner Hennock dissented, arguing that edi-
torializing should be forbidden "in the absence of some method of policing and enforcing the
requirement that the public trust granted a licensee be exercised in an impartial manner."
31. See, e.g., FCC, OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE MATTER OF EDI-
TORIALIZING DY BROADCAST LICENSEES 616 (1948) (statement on behalf of CIO). The
primary objection appears to be directed against institutional editorializing by the station,
rather than against editorializing by the licensee in his personal capacity. See id. at 591
(statement on behalf of Radio Writers Guild), 622-4 (statement on behalf of CIO),
12334 (statement on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union).
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afford fair opportunity for expressions of opposing views? 2 But where a
broadcaster is inclined to tip the scales in favor of one side, he will do so
whether or not he has taken an open stand. In fact, there may well be less
likelihood of abuse when the broadcaster is an open advocate, since unfair-
ness in that case would be more readily perceptible to both the public and
the FCC.33
An arbitrary ban does not operate to advance the fundamental aim of the
"fairness" formula-adequate and representative treatment of public
issues. It does not stop the licensee from expressing his views, nor prevent
unfair tactics which distort the overall presentation of controversial mat-
ters. Even when free to do so, broadcasters have seldom made a practice of
airing their stands on public questions by means of overt editorials.34 When
they have sought to influence public opinion on controversial issues, they
have apparently considered it much more effective to rely upon indirect
means-either "slanting" ostensibly impartial programs such as news re-
ports and analyses, or presenting partisan programs reflecting the views of
the broadcaster but not identifying him as their source." A ban on edi-
32. See FCC, REPORT OF THE Co ussIoN In THE MATTER OF EDrTomAizM:G 33
BROADCAST LicENsEEs 8 (1949).
33. See, e.g., FCC, On'icma REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE MATTER op Errou.A=Lz-
ING BY BROADCAST LICENsEEs 627-8 (1948) (testimony on behalf of CIO).
34. See, e.g., VIrE, TnE AmIcAN RAnio 213 (1947). In the hearings before the
FCC, the presidents of ABC and NBC both testified that their networks never had exer-
cised, and did not now contemplate exercising, the right of editorializing; they merely
wished to establish the fact that they had that right. N.Y. Times, March 2, 1948, p. 27, col.
1. CBS' president indicated that his network was prepared to present editorial programs
if the FCC acknowledged the right of editorializing. The network, hovever, has pre-
sented no such programs since the FCC issued its report in June, 1949. Communication
to the YA=E LAW JouRNAL from William Ackermat of CBS, dated March 8, 1950, in Yale
Law Library. Although no precise data is available as to the extent to which local sta-
tions editorialize, it has been felt that in general they have made little use of this mode of
expression, and that the supposed ban imposed by the Mayflower decision had little to do
with this reluctance. See VHrr, op. cit. supra, at 176-8, 1S9-90, 213-15. See also SunP-
ANN, RADIo's SECoND CHANcE 126-7 (1947).
35. See Note, Radio Editorials and the Mfayflower Doctrine, 48 Co.. L. Rv. 785, 792
(1948) ; Stewart, Radio Commentators and Free Speech, Common Sense, Aug., 1945, p.
32; Sussmann, How Radio Treated Labor in the Elections, Common Sense, March, 1945,
p. 34; Howe, Policing the Commentator, Atlantic Monthly, Nov., 1943, p. 46. It is im-
possible, of course, to determine with any precision the extent to which licensees shape the
views expressed over their stations. But one authority found frequent cases of gross
abuse by local stations, while judging the record of the networks to be "fair to good."
Wecter, Hearing is Believing, Atlantic Monthly, June, 1945, pp. 54, 56-7. In the selection
of commentators and speakers, licensees are inclined to choose men whose views roughly
coincide with their own. In this respect they are no different from commercial sponsors.
See Howe, Policing the Coinentator, mpra, at 47. Some insight may be gained from the
surprisingly frank comment of Lyle Van, VOR news commentator, immediately after the
FCC issued its report confirming the right of editorializing. "Whereas others may have
stayed away from controversial matters, WOR has continually used this program to ex-
press its own editorial viewpoints.... We will continue [to do so], only now with the
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torializing, by stilling open partisanship, merely compels complete reliance
on this oblique mode of propagandizing. In addition, the various "unfair"
tactics by which broadcasters favor particular views-whether more patent
abuses such as unequal allotment of time, or subtler abuses such as dis-
criminatory use of production resources and selection of unrepresentative
spokesmen for opposing views-may as readily be employed in connection
with covert propagandizing as with open editorializing.
A ban not only fails to accomplish what it sets out to do; it actually under-
mines the "fairness" formula. By fostering veiled rather than open partisan-
ship, it further exposes the public to a form of propaganda less amenable to
intelligent appraisal. Moreover, rather than compensating for weak ad-
ministration of the discretionary "fairness" formula,16 a ban on broadcaster
editorializing makes enforcement more difficult. The more vexing problem
in administering the formula is identification of partisan expressions of
opinion rather than application of the formula once such expressions have
been discerned.37 By preventing only the labelling rather than the expres-
sion of broadcasters' opinions, a ban on editorializing accentuates this
problem. Furthermore, if a ban were in effect, the FCC might well place
unjustified reliance on this supposedly automatic device, diluting the force
behind the general formula and deflecting attention from more important
sources of abuse.3" Finally, this type of measure is almost certain to stifle
blessing of the FCC." Newsweek, June 13, 1949, p. 51, col. 1. The pending KMPC case,
involving charges that the majority stockholder in the station ordered the news manager
to "Keep hammering away at the Jews . .. [ who are] all Communists," presents what is
presumably an unusual case of abuse. N.Y. Herald-Tribune, March 9, 1948, p. 19, col. 1.
36. One of the arguments most often advanced by proponents of a ban is that the
"fairness" formula cannot be enforced effectively, and that an arbitrary ban on editorializ-
ing is an expedient means of compensating for this deficiency and enhancing fairness. See,
e.g., FCC, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION IN THE MATrER OF EDITORIALIZING BY BROADCAST
LICENSEES (1949) (dissent by Commissioner Hennock) ; Note, Radio Editorials and the
Mayflower Doctrine, 48 COL. L. REv. 785, 792 (1948) ; FCC, OFFiCIAL REPORT or PRO-
CEEDINGS IN THE MATTER OF EDITORIALIZING BY BROADCAST LICENSEES 625 (1948) (testi-
mony on behalf of CIO).
37. See, e.g., Note, Radio Editorials and the Mayflower Doctrie, 48 COL. L. REV.
785, 792 (1948).
38. Overt advocacy by licensees does not pose the greatest threat to fairness. Broad-
casters have widely eschewed the particular role of open partisan, and have been predomi-
nantly apathetic in bringing views on controversial issues before the public. See, e.g.,
WHITE, THE AMERIcAN RADIO, 176-8, 189-90, 213-15, 223 (1947); SIEPMANN, RADIO'S
SECOND CHANCE 125-7 (1947). A greater threat to fairness may be found in the hold of
sponsors and their advertising agents over program content. See CoMissioN o FiRE-
Dom OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PREss 63-4, 72-4 (1947) ; Wun, op. cit.
supra, at 55-67, 213. Broadcasters have on occasion been frank to concede such control.
E.g., a statement of the president of NBC: "The argument is now advanced that business
control of broadcasting operations has nothing to do with program control. This is to
forget that 'he who controls the pocketbook controls the man.' Business control means
complete control and there is no use arguing to the contrary." Quoted in SIEPMANN, RADIO's
SECOND CHANCE 190-1 (1947). Here, it would seem, lies the primary impulse toward
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rather than stimulate the increased open discussion of controversial issues
which is a basic goal of the "fairness" formula. Prohibited from airing their
own views openly, broadcasters will be even more inclined than at present
to avoid offering open discussions of controversial matters."
Thus the FCC's rejection of the .1fayflower ban seems amply justified-
not because the ban unduly shackled broadcasters, but because it failed to
promote, and indeed may have jeopardized, representative discussion of
public issues on the air.
Fair treatment of public issues over radio will not be achieved by muzzling
broadcasters, but by more vigorous enforcement of the general "fairness"
formula. The FCC, as the agency directly responsible for implementing
public policy with respect to radio, seems unduly hesitant in securing for
the public adequate and balanced discussion of controversial issues. While
the Commission has been active in defining the standards of performance
required under the "fairness" formula, it has been notably passive in en-
forcing them. 4 In the past the FCC has appraised the manner in which
broadcasters have presented public issues only when some question has
been raised in a license proceeding by a competing applicant or by a person
who has been refused broadcasting time by a station. Furthermore, the
Commission has done virtually nothing to identify the apparently large
volume of partisan propaganda which now escapes scrutiny under the "fair-
ness" formula because it has not been labelled at the source as "opinion."
A more effective plan of enforcement might embody the following sug-
gestions. First, the FCC could require all applicants for license renewal to
make and substantiate an affirmative claim that they have allotted a reason-
able amount of time to discussion of controversial issues, and that such dis-
cussion has, in the overall, been presented in a fair and representative man-
ner. Second, in line with this suggestion, the Commission could specifically
require all such applicants to enumerate and summarize all partisan expres-
sions emanating from their stations, whether formally tagged "opinion" or
not.4 1 Finally, if more direct measures prove necessary, the Commission
might establish a permanent impartial body to analyze the contents of
broadcast programs on a random sampling basis. The purpose would not
bias in radio-an impulse which can be regulated and restrained only through the "fair-
ness" formula. To impose an ineffectual but controversial ban on editorializing by the
less aggressive and often subservient licensee, and thus involve the FCC in a running de-
bate similar to the one surrounding the Mayflower Doctrine, might well impede positive
action against propagandizing by advertisers and sponsors.
39. See, e.g., FCC, OFFIcA. REoaR, rpra note 36, at 636, 650 (testimony of Morris
Novik).
40. See VHVTrE, op. cit. supra note 38; Smx ,"N, op. cit. supra note 38, at 125-7.
41. A comprehensive audit of the "controversial" content of broadcast programs is
essential to consistent enforcement of the "fairness" formula. The difficulty of this task
is far outweighed by the importance of securing fair treatment of public issues over radio.
It would not seem unreasonable to impose the tWsk of making an initial "tabulation" on
the broadcasters.
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